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THE GOVERNOR'S PRIVATE EYES
TAMAR FRANKEL*
In his inaugural speech on January 3, 1967, Florida Governor Claude
Kirk declared a War on Crime. For this purpose he announced the creation
of a unique War on Crime Program. Its activities were to include a Citizen's
Awareness Program, but its main function was directed to the investigation
of crimes. As the Program's director, the Governor appointed Mr. George
Wackenhut, the president of the Wackenhut Corporation, a large private
investigation firm. Mr. Wackenhut agreed to provide his services for one
dollar a year; his corporation was simultaneously retained to supply the
Program with the necessary administrative facilities and investigative man-
power.' Payment for these services was expected to be covered by donations
from hopeful and grateful citizens of Florida.
The duties of the Program's investigators were to receive complaints of
alleged criminal law violations, to conduct investigations, to make findings
and evaluations of facts, and then either to close the file or to proceed
towards an arrest, indictment and conviction by referring the matter to
regular law enforcement agencies. 2 The purpose of their activities was to
look into charges of criminal deeds with a view to bringing the culprits to
justice.3 The investigators themselves had no power to arrest, nor privilege
to carry arms, but the Governor requested all law enforcement agencies to
cooperate with them. This request included surrender of confidential police
files.4 Probably, too, the Director, with the Governor's approval, exerted
a certain amount of pressure to produce such cooperation.5 Moreover, the
investigators were "commissioned" by the Governor "to conduct investiga-
tions on behalf of the State of Florida" and for that purpose each was an
Assistant Professor of Law, Boston University; LL.B., Jerusalem Law Classes, 1947,
LL.M., Harvard, 1964.
1 The agreement between the Governor and the Wackenhut Corporation is not a
public document, but Mr. Wackenhut, the president of the corporation, has supplied
some information in the form of a fact sheet that he published as the director of the
Program [hereinafter cited as Fact Sheet], and in his address to the stockholders of the
corporation at their first annual meeting held on April 24, 1967. Much of the data con-
tained in this paper is derived from these two documents and from the Governor's
inaugural address on January 3, 1967.
2 Fact Sheet at 3, 6-7; Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla.
1967).
3 Fact Sheet at 7:
In the short space of 14 weeks, a total of 17 arrests have been made on 44 different
criminal counts by duly constituted law enforcement agencies as a result of infor-
mation furnished by the Governor's War on Crime investigators.
I can state affirmatively that many indictments and arrests will shortly be forth-
coming.
4 The Chief of Police of the City of Tampa asked Attorney General Earl Faircloth
for an opinion as to the power of the Governor to require the surrender of secret police
files to the investigators. The Attorney General was of the opinion that the Governor
had no such powers. Op. Att'y Gen., March 2, 1967.
5 Cf. Directive No. 6 to the Program's investigators, which reads as follows: "If any
state or local law enforcement officers refuse to cooperate, you should immediately advise
headquarters and pursue the matter no further unless instructed." Fact Sheet at 5.
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"official representative, of the Governor." 6 They; therefore, gathered infor-
mation regarding criminal activities of specific individuals in the name of
and on behalf of the state.
One of the main reasons for the adoption of this unique program was
the Governor's desire to by-pass the legislature, in order to avoid delays
and to ensure the immediate availability of funds. 7 Instead of attempting
to create a governmental department, the Governor retained the Wackenhut
Corporation; instead of trying to obtain funds through legislative appro-
priations, he planned to solicit donations from private citizens, hold such
donations as a private trustee, and use them to finance the War. However,
the laws of Florida provide that funds received by any state official "under
the authority of the laws of the state" must be deposited in the state
treasury and disbursed pursuant to an appropriation s or under a trust
established with the approval of the planning and budget commission for
a "purpose authorized by law." In two Advisory Opinions to the Governor
the Supreme Court of Florida held that the donations would be received
"under the authority of the laws of the state" and the establishment of the
Program was, indeed, a "purpose authorized by law."' 0 The result of these
opinions was to subject the disbursement of the donations to the approval
of the legislature or the planning and budget commission, exactly what
the Program was devised to avoid. This may have been one of the reasons
for its premature death.
Even though the Program no longer exists, its creation and activation
raise constitutional and policy questions that merit discussion. The pur-
pose of this paper is to examine the legal basis of such a type of program,
to evaluate its desirability, and to analyze the law enforcement powers of
state governors and the means that they may employ in exercising those
powers. In particular, this paper will consider the following questions: When
may a governor conduct or authorize investigation of crimes with a view
to prosecution of offenders? What, if any, are the investigatory powers of
a governor? When, if ever, may criminal investigations be performed by a
private contractor on behalf of the state? Finally, what are the merits and
disadvantages of employing an independent contractor to carry out inves-
tigations like those of the War on Crime Program?
6 Id. at 3.
7 The Director was frank: The Governor's problem, he said, was that there was no
statewide law enforcement agency in Florida. "Formation of a new governmental agency
would have called for approval from the State Legislature not then in session." There
were no governmental funds immediately available. "Furthermore, no such funds would
become available until the legislature provided them. There was no telling when that
might be." Id. at 2.
8 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 215.31 (1958).
9 Fla. Stat; Ann. § 215.32(2)(b) (Supp. 1969).
10 Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1967); Advisory Opinion to
the Governor, 201 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1967).
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE CRIMES
When may a Governor investigate or authorize the investigation of crimes
with a view to prosecution of offenders? It is submitted that, absent express
constitutional or statutory authorization, he may neither perform nor autho-
rize such functions. The Florida Supreme Court based the legitimacy of
the Program on the constitutional provision imposing on the Governor a
duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"11 and on two sections
of a Florida statute. 12
A. The "Take Care" Provision
Most state constitutions vest in the governor the power of the "supreme"
or "chief" executive.' 3 Most state constitutions also impose upon the gov-
ernor, directly or by implication,14 a duty to "take care" that the laws be
faithfully executed. 15 These constitutional provisions have received diverse
interpretations by state courts, depending upon the text of the laws under
consideration, the context of and the parties to the controversy, and the
view taken by courts and legislatures of their governor's role in the orga-
11 Fla. Const. art. IV, § 6; Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla.
1967).
12 See pp. 639, 646-47, infra.
13 Ala. Const. art. V, § 113; Alas. Const. art. III, § 1; Ark. Const. art. VI, § 2; Cal.
Const. art. V, § 1; Colo. Const. art. IV, § 2; Conn. Const. art. IV, § 5; Del. Const. art. III,
§ 1; Fla. Const. art. IV, § 1; Ga. Const. art. V, § .I, 1; Hawaii Const. art. IV, § 1; Idaho
Const. art. IV, § 5; Ill. Const. art. V, § 6; Ind. Const. art. V, § 1; Iowa Const. art. IV, § 1;
Kan. Const. art. I, § 3; Ky. Const. § 69; La. Const. art. V, § 2; Me. Const. art. V,
Pt. I, § 1; Md. Const. art. II, § 1; Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. I; Mich. Const.
art. V, § 1; Miss. Const. art. V, § 116; Mont. Const. art. VII, § 5; Neb. Const. art. IV,
§ 6; Nev. Const. art. V, § 1; N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 41; N.J. Const. art. V, § I, I;
N.M. Const. art. V, § 4; N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 1; N.C. Const. art. III, § 1; N.D. Const.
art. III, § 71; Ohio Const. art. III, § 5; Okla. Const. art. VI, § 2; Ore. Const. art. V, § 1;
Pa. Const. art. IV, § 2; R.I. Const. art. VII, § 1; S.C. Const. art. IV, § 1; S.D. Const. art.
IV, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. III, § 1; Tex. Const. art. IV, § 1; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 3; Va.
Const. art. V, § 69; Wash. Const. art. III, § 2; W. Va. Const. art. VII, § 6; Wyo. Const.
art. IV, § 1.
14 In Massachusetts, for instance, the duty to see that the laws be executed can be im-
plied from the language of the oath which the governor takes upon taking office and
Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. VII, which provides that the militia may be called
out for "the enforcement of the laws."
15 Ala. Const. art. V. § 120; Alas. Const. art. III, § 16; Ariz. Const.. art. V, § 4; Ark.
Const. art. VI, § 7; Cal. Const. art. V, § 7; Colo. Const. art. IV, § 2; Conn. Const. art.
IV, § 12; Del. Const. art. III, § 17; Fla. Const. art. IV, § 6; Hawaii Const. art. IV, § 5;
Idaho Const. art. IV, § 5; Ill. Const. art. V, § 6; Ind. Const. art. V, § 16; Iowa Const.
art. IV, § 9; Kan. Const. art. I, § 3; Ky. Const. § 81; La. Const. art. V, § 14; Me. Const.
art. V, pt. 1, § 12; Md. Const. art. II, § 9; Mich. Const. art. V, § 8; Minn. Const. art. V,
§ 4; Miss. Const. art. V, § 123; Mo. Const. art. VII, § 5; Neb. Const. art. IV, § 6; Nev.
Const. art. V, § 7; N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 41; N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, 11; N.M. Const. art.
V, § 4; N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 3; N.C. Const. art. III, § 7; N.D. Const. art. III, § 75; Ohio
Const. art. III, § 6; Okla. Const. art. VI, § 8; Ore. Const. art. V, § 10; Pa. Const. art. IV,
§ 2; R.I. Const. art. VII, § 2; S.C. Const. art. IV, § 12; S.D. Const. art. IV, § 4; Tenn.
Const. art. III, § 10; Tex. Const. art. IV, § 10; Utah Const. art. VII, § 5; Vt. Const.
ch. II, § 20; Va. Const. art. V, § 73; Wash. Const. art. III, § 5; W. Va. Const. art. VII,
§ 5; Wis. Const. art. V, § 4; Wyo. Const. art. IV, § 4.
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nizational scheme of government. Moreover, in many states the position of
governor has undergone drastic changes from a mere figurehead to a strong
head of the executive branch. Many of the decisions cited, therefore, refer
to gubernatorial powers that have since been expressly granted by consti-
tutional 6 or statutory17 provisions. The governors' positions have been
strengthened by legislative and constitutional grants, not by judicial inter-
pretation, which explains the governors' emphasis on their relationships
with the legislatures s and the paucity of courts' opinions in this area.
With this as background, a few general conclusions regarding judicial
interpretation of the "take care" provision may be cautiously drawn. First,
with notable exceptions, such as Indiana, 19 state courts have interpreted
governors' constitutional executive powers not as a limitation, but as a
grant.20 Neither was the "take care" provision regarded by those courts
as a source of diverse implied powers. Specific functions had to be based
on specific constitutional or statutory grants, and executed in strict con-
formity therewith, 21 except, perhaps, the power to sue22 or to control suit28
16 N.J. Const. art. 4, § 5, 5. See Richman v. Lignham, 22 N.J. 40, 53-54, 123 A.2d
372, 379-80 (1956).
17 E.g., C. Rohr, The Governor of Maryland 114 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Rohr]. See
also Henry v. State, 87 Miss. 1 (1905), dissent modified, 88 Miss. 843, 39 So. 856 (1906)
(containing full report) holding that the Governor may not represent the state in the
state courts. The legislature then provided the Governor with such power. See Temple v.
State, 123 Miss. 741, 86 So. 580 (1920).
18 See L. Lipson, The American Governor, From Figurehead to Leader (1939) [herein-
after cited as Lipson]; J. Phillips, State and Local Government in America 189 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Phillips]; Carley, Legal and Extra-Legal Powers of Wisconsin Gover-
nors in Legislative Relations, 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 3.
19 Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941). See also Spears v. Reeves, 148
Cal. 501, 83 P. 432 (1906); Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders As Devices For Ad-
ministrative Direction and Control, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 78, 81 (1964).
20 Field v. People, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79 (1839); Martin v. Chandler, 318 S.W.2d 40 (Ky.
1958); Opinion of Justices, 72 Me. 542 (1881) (Governor's powers are only those that are
generally given to him by the constitution or necessarily inferable from powers clearly
granted, and he is to execute powers conferred upon him in the manner and under the
methods and limitations prescribed); State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner, 123 Mont. 414, 214
P.2d 747 (1950) (Governor had no implied power to transact judicial business, such as
directing judges to hold court); Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 609, 161 P. 164, 167
(1916) (dictum); Wentz v. Thomas, 159 Okla. 124, 15 P.2d 65 (1932) (powers of removal
of officers not necessarily implied from the constitutional take care provision); cf. Shields
v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74, 89 (1874). Contra, Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270
(1941), which seems to be an exception.
21 Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. State, 232 Ark. 156, 335 S.W.2d 312 (1960) (per-
mits and easements signed by the Governor and other state officials purporting to au-
thorize the laying of a pipeline do not bind the state in absence of express legislative
authority); Martin v. Chandler, 318 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1958) (The Governor has no power
to transfer functions from one agency to another. He "has only such powers as are
vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes enacted pursuant thereto."); Rohr,
supra note 17, at 100-02 (1932). Contra, Gordon v. Morrow, 186 Ky. 713, 218 S.W. 258
(1920) (Governor had power to dismiss a private attorney, such power being implied from
the statutory authority to hire).
22 See cases cited in note 27, infra.
23 State v. Dawson, 86 Kan. 180, 119 P. 360 (1911) (the Attorney General had no dis-
cretion to refuse to prosecute when required to by the Governor); cf. Morss v. Forbes,
24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957), as to the Governor's control over county prosecutors.
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in state courts. The above interpretations may be contrasted with those of
the Supreme Court of the United States, tending to interpret constitutional
provisions concerning presidential executive power as a limitation rather
than a grant.24 The reason some presidents have not made use of such
permissive interpretation (for example, President Taft)25 is self-restraint not
judicial constraint.
Second (and this rule seems to govern on the federal level too),26 power
that is not in harmony with legislative intention may not be implied from
the "take care" provision. For example, in Oklahoma the "take care" pro-
vision was interpreted to give the Governor implied power to represent
the state in the state's courts. 27 Yet, the same court held that where a
statute granted the Bank Commissioner authority to institute proceedings
on behalf of the state, the Governor was precluded from instituting such
proceedings, except, perhaps, when the Commissioner refused to act. The
argument that the "take care" provision gave the Governor an implied
power to prosecute this action was rejected on the ground that the consti-
tution required the Governor to observe all laws, including the statutory
grant of power to the Commissioner, especially in this case, where the same
law provided the substantive legal basis for the action.28
Third, the "take care" provision, per se, does not furnish a basis for
governors' powers to appoint or remove officers. As noted, governors were
not granted full control over the executive branch.29 Even today, when the
trend is toward stronger executive heads of state government, many state
24 E.g., In re Neagle, 135 US. 1 (1890). See generally 2 C. Antieau, Modern Constitu-
tional Law § 13.27 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Antieau]; E. Corwin, The President: Office
and Powers 147-54 (4th rev. ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as Corwin]; 2 B. Schwartz, A Com-
mentary on the Constitution of the United States 59-65 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Schwartz].
25 Corwin, supra note 24, at 153.
26 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); 2 Schwartz, supra
note 24, at 71-73; Corwin, Comment: The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without
Straw, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 53 (1953).
27 State ex rel. Haskell v. Huston, 21 Okla. 782, 790-91, 97 P. 982, 985-86 (1908). The
court could have based its decision on a statutory provision but chose the constitutional
"take care" clause instead. Mississippi seems to be the only state where the court held that
the take care provision did not by implication grant the Governor power to represent
the state in the state's courts. The take care provision, said the court, should be viewed
as no more than "'a comprehensive description of the duty of the executive to watch
with vigilance over all the public interests.'" Henry v. State, 87 Miss. 1, 35-54 (1905),
dissent modified, 88'Miss. 845, 39 So. 856, 862 (1906) (containing full report). The decision
was overruled by the Mississippi legislature, which expressly authorized the Governor to
bring proper suit in cases affecting the general public. The court promptly proceeded
to interpret this statutory provision strictly and there the matter rests. Temple v. State
ex rel. Russell, 123 Miss. 741, 86 So. 580 (1920). See also Alexander v. State, 56 Ga. 478
(1876) (as to power to sue based oh a duty to supervise all state property); State ex rel.
Strauss v. Dubuclet, 25 La. Ann. 161, 163 (1873) (as to such power stated in general
terms).
28 State ex rel. Murray v. Pure Oil Co., 169 Okla. 507, 509-11, 37 P.2d 608, 610-11 (1934).
29 B. Maddox & R. Fuquay, State and Local Government 78-80 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Maddox & Fuquay]. See, e.g., Wentz v. Thomas, 159 Okla. 124, 177, 15 P.2d 65, 114
(1932).
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constitutions still provide for elected key officials.80 By contrast, the federal
chief executive was granted more power to control the executive branch,8 1
including the power to appoint most of his officers, and as early as 1926 the
Supreme Court recognized his power to remove all executive officers. 82 At
times Congress has narrowed presidential power of appointment by creating
tailor-made offices, 8 but such occasions have been rare. The principle that
the power to appoint is vested in the President is not questioned.3 4 On the
state level the power to appoint and remove officers is generally held not
to be exclusively executive, and, subject to express constitutional grants,
such power is deemed vested in the legislature.8 5 Indiana seems to be the
80 J. Kallenbach, Federal Cobperation With the States Under the Commerce Clause
377 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Kallenbach]; Maddox & Fuquay, supra note 29, at 87;
Rohr, supra note 17, at 110-112.
31 Historically the constitution of the United States owes its language in Article II,
§§ 1 & 3 to state constitutions. But unlike most state governors at the date of the draft-
ing, the .president was given more power to control the executive branch of the govern-
ment and a greater measure of independence from the legislature in the conduct of his
executive functions. Kallenbach, supra note 30, at 32-56, 56, 376; 2 Schwartz, supra note
24, at 35-38; The 50 States and Their Local Governments 223, 224 (J. Fesler ed. 1968);
Carley, Legal and Extra-Legal: Powers of Wisconsin Governors in Legislative Relations,
1962 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 13, 16, 17; Young, The Development of the Governorship, 31 State
Government 178 (1958). In the states, the movement towards a "stronger chief executive"
took place only in later years. Since most of the oldest state constitutions were drafted
with the vivid, memory of the British .Governor in mind, the tendency was to establish
a weak executive and a strong legislature, as a buffer to tyranny. During the years that
followed, the fear of a strong executive subsided, and the need for an effective admin-
istration of state affairs manifested itself. Also, the evils of a strong legislature have
proven that democracy is better preserved by checks and balances rather than the pre-
dominance of a legislature. For a survey of the development of the office of the Governor,
see Corwin, supra. note 24, at 30; Kallenbach,. supra note 30, at 334-36; Lipson, supra
note 18; Maddox & Fuquay, supra note 29, at 66-68; Phillips, supra note 18, at 185-88;
Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices For Administrative Direction and Con-
trol, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 78 (1964); Note, Presidential Power: Use and Enforcement of Ex-
ecutive Orders, 39 Notre Dame Lawyer 44 (1963). Notice that the trend towards. strength-
ening the state's chief executive (following the federal example) has not gone unques-
tioned: Highsaw, The Southern Governor--Challenge to the Strong Executive Theme,
19 Public Administration Rev. 7 (1959).
82 Myers Adm'rx v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Corwin, supra note 24, at 85-95.
88 2 Schwartz, supra note 24, at 43-4.
84 Id. at 40-45; Note, Power to Appoint to Public Office under the Federal Constitution,
42 Harv. L. Rev. 426 (1928).
35 There is a constitutional provision permitting the Massachusetts General Court to
name officers. Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. I, § I, art. IV; see, e.g., Opinion of the Justices,
302 Mass. 605, 622, 19 N.E.2d 807, 818 (1939). See also Fox v. McDonald, 101 Ala.
51, 13 So. 416 (1893); Dunbar v. Cronin, 18 Ariz. 583, 164 P. 447 (1917), and cases cited
therein; State ex rel. Landis v. Bird, 120 Fla. 780, 163 So. 248 (1935) (authority to appoint,
especially judges, is not inherent in the governor); Thorne v. Squier, 264 Mich. 97, 109,
249 N.W. 497, 500 (1933) (power to appoint). See, e.g., State ex rel. Wehe v. Frazier, 47
N.D. 314, 328, 182 N.W. 545; 548 (1921) (the fact that the Constitution vested in the
governor the executive power does not grant the governor the power of removal unless
by legislative act the power is made executive, as with the power of appointment). The
Governor's power is distinguished from presidential power in Hutchins v. Des Moines,
176 Iowa 189, 207, 157 N.W. 881, 887 (1916) (lists cases holding that the power of ap-
pointment is. inherently executive; Ill., Ala., Md., Ore., Cal., Iowa decisions justified the
point). For a description of legislative appointment in Maryland, see Rohr, supra note
17, at 112-16. See also Phillips, supra note 18, at 186. See also A. Holcombe, State Govern-
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only state where the power to appoint and remove officers has been held by
judicial interpretation to be vested exclusively in the Governor. In Tucker
v. State86 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that a statute which provided
for appointment of officers by both the Governor and others was unconsti-
tutional. The decision was based on the "take care" provisions.
It is inconceivable that the Constitution makers would vest in the Gov-
ernor the entire executive power, with the admonition that he take care
that the laws are enforced, knowing that in enforcing them he must
have the assistance of subordinates, and then strip him of all appoint-
ive power.37
The court rejected the argument that the Governor had only such powers
as were expressly granted to him by the constitution and the laws. It held
that executive appointive powers were implied from the constitutional pro-
vision. But most state courts seem to have gone the other way. Their posi-
tion is well summarized by the dissent in the Tucker case:
The governor by Art. 5 § 16, is not required to execute the laws but
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." If officers fail to per-
form their duties, the governor may remove them if the constitution
gives him that right or, if not, "bring the subject to the cognizance of
that department of the government which has the power to remove or
punish them. He may in sufficient emergency call out the mili-
tia .... [But, he does not necessarily] "have agents of his own nom-ination."ss
Fourth, as a corollary to the principles cited above, the "take care" pro-
vision pertains to governors' duties to supervise the operation of the exec-
utive branch of the government, and not to any authority or duty to execute
or enforce the laws personally or through personal agents. This provision
does not cast governors in the role of law enforcers 9 but rather as over-
seers of the legality of performance by those to whom law enforcement
was specifically entrusted.40 It is assumed that whenever in the opinion of
ment in the United States 334-36 (3d ed. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Holcombe]; Dawley,
The Governors' Constitutional Powers of Appointment and Removal, 22 Minn. L. Rev.
451 (1938); Mechem, The Power to Appoint to Office: Its Location and Limits, 1 Mich.
L. Rev. 531 (1903).
36 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941).
87 Id. at 655-56, 35 N.E.2d at 285.
88 Id. at 714-15, 35 N.E.2d at 308.
39 E.g., Illinois: Ill. Const. art. V, § 6; 1918 Att'y Gen. Rep. 805 (Governor had
no power to aid the courts in the execution of their process except by virtue of his power
to use the militia in case the courts are obstructed in enforcing their process); 1915
Att'y Gen. Rep. 78 (Governor had no power by virtue of the "take care" provision to
enforce the Sunday closing law).
40 Arizona State Dep't v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960) (the Attorney Gen-
eral had no power to test the legality of an action by the Land Department, such au-
thority being reserved to the Governor, under the take care provision and the statutes);
Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74, 89, 90 (1874), overruled on another point in Simms v.
Sawyer, 85 W. Va. 245, 101 S.E. 467 (1919). See also Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H.
183, 152 A2d 870 (1959) (as to the New Hampshire Governor and Council's interest in
the legality of operations of the executive branch). For a similar description of the posi-
tion of the Governor and his duties as supreme executive in Maine, see State v. Simon,
149 Me. 256, 99 A.2d 922 (1953).
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the governor specific laws should be carried out, he will activate the ap-
propriate officers, and if they refuse, he may have resort to the courts.4 1
However, when law enforcement officers are elected or occupy a semi-auton-
omous position,42 the law enforcement activities of a governor are not al-
ways effective or efficient. In such cases they were probably not intended
to be. 43
On the federal level the problem rarely arises because the President of
the United States controls the executive branch and can execute the laws
by directing the officers entrusted with specific duties. In re Neagle,44 how-
ever, is an example of a President, without express legislative authority,
appointing his own nominee to act in an area already committed to other
law enforcement agencies. The authority for such action was implied from
the "take care" provision in the Federal Constitution. Except in Indiana,
it is doubtful whether any governor has such implied powers. Moreover, it
seems that the "take care" provision does not, by itself, furnish a basis for
the employment of outside help to perform services parallel to those of stat-
utory or constitutional officials. 45 There are a few instances where governors,
without legislative authority, employed outsiders, usually counsel, to act
concurrently with public officials. 46 Attempts by executive officers and grand
juries to employ outsiders have been generally invalidated, especially when
the functions duplicated were expressly entrusted to these same .public
officials. 47
41 Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 52, 59 So. 963, 967 (1912) (citing State v. Craw-
ford, 28 Fla. 44, 10 So. 118 (1891) as standing for the proposition that "the Governor as
such could maintain an action to compel the performance of a ministerial official action
when the people of the State had an interest."); State ex rel. Stubbs v. Dawson, 86 Kan.
180, 191, 119 P. 360, 364 (1911).
42 For a discussion of the autonomous position of law enforcement agencies see Phil-
lips, supra note 18, at 188. For an historical description see Holcombe, supra note 35, at
404-06. See, e.g., In re Di Brizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 213, 101 N.E.2d 464, 467 (1951), where
great emphasis was put on the fact that the Governor had "requested" and not "or-
dered" the Attorney General to use the statutory powers of investigation.
43 See, e.g., Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832 (1936) (dictum) (even though
the Governor is chief executive, the Constitution gives him very little power vis-h-vis a
strong legislature).
44 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
45 The Supreme Court of Florida was of the same opinion. In Advisory Opinion to
the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1967), it based the Governor's authority to employ
investigators on the take care provision "as implemented" by legislation. See also, e.g.,
Randall v. State, 16 Wis. 362 (1863) (Governor had no implied power to hire an attorney
to attend the taking of testimony in support of charges preferred against a county
officer to procure his removal from office).
46 See note 41, supra.
47 For example, a grand jury may not employ investigators without express legislative
authority: Allen v. Payne, 1 Cal. 2d 607, 608, 36 P.2d 614 (1934); Note, The Grand Jury
as an Investigatory Body, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590, 596 (1961); Note, The Grand Jury-Its
Investigatory Powers and Limitations, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 586, 599 (1953). See also Woody
v. Peairs, 35 Cal. App. 553, 170 P. 660, 661 (1917); William J. Burns Int'l Detective
Agency v. Holt, 138 Minn. 165, 168, 164 N.W. 590, 592 (1917); William J. Burns Int'l
Detective Agency v. Doyle, 46 Nev. 91, 208 P. 427 (1922). These decisions are also based
on the ground that a grand jury should inquire into crimes in the manner provided for
by law, a ground with separation of powers underpinning. Other grounds incluled the
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Decisions restricting power to employ outsiders to function concurrently
with public officers are sometimes based on the principle prohibiting del-
egation of powers or usurpation of powers48 and on the rule that when the
mode of performing an authorized activity is prescribed, no other method
of doing it may be employed. The obligation of the Attorney General to
furnish legal services to departments of state government in Kentucky was
held to bar such departments from employing their own lawyers49 and to
require a legislative special authority for the employment of outside coun-
sel.50 The principle against delegation of powers was applied to the Gov-
ernor of Michigan in his attempt to employ an attorney to assist him in
drafting proposals for new legislation.51
It should be noted that contracts which provide for outside services to
assist the hiring entity in the performance of its own duties, especially with
expert assistance, have been upheld.52 But since the Florida Program's in-
vestigators rendered assistance to the police, F.B.I. and other law enforce-
ment agencies in the performance of their duties,53 and not to the Governor
in the performance of his, this exception does not apply to their employ-
ment.
B. Power to Act in Emergency and Command the Militia
From this analysis, the rule would appear to be: A governor may not
rely on the "take care" provision as authority to personally execute the
law, including crime investigations or the authorization of such investi-
gations, unless and until the legislature has expressly authorized him to do
so. To this rule, there exists an almost universal exception: When public
officers are unable or unwilling to act, the governor should step in and act
in their stead. Thus, in Johnson v. Conner54 an Oklahoma court confirmed
an appointment of a private attorney hired by the Governor to represent
the interests of the state in court, basing the Governor's authority on the
"take care" provision.
negation of inherent power to hire investigators, the undesirability of duplication of
functions and the reservation of such functions to regular police.
48 State ex rel. Balser v. Bowen, 111 Ohio 561, 146 N.E. 108 (1924). Where the degree
of interference by private employees in the execution of official duties is great, a Penn-
sylvania court deemed such interference as an illegal ousting of the public official and
voided the employment also on this ground. Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 556-59,
185 A.2d 135, 137-38 (1962).
49 Montgomery V. Gayle, 216 Ky. 567, 288 S.W. 323 (1926).
50 Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291. Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820 (1940).
Similar reasoning has been adopted in other jurisdictions: State ex rel. Workmen v.
Goldthait, 172 Ind. 210, 87 N.E. 122 (1909); Simpson v. Silver Bow County, 87 Mont. 83,
285 P. 195 (1930); Francher v. Board of Comm'rs, 28 N.M. 179, 210 P. 237 (1922); News-
Dispatch Printing & Auditing Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 61 Okla. 259, 161 P. 207 (1916).
51 Cahill v. Board of State Auditors, 127 Mich. 487, 86 N.W. 950 (1901) (the court felt
that preparing bills and resolutions was not part of the Governor's duty).
52 Pritchard & Abbott v. McKenna, 162 Tex. 617, 350 S.W.2d 333 (1961). See also Skid-
more v. County of Amador, 7 Cal. 2d 37, 59 P.2d 818 (1936); Nelson v. Blanco Ind.
School Dist., 390 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
53 Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 1967).
54 205 Okla. 233, 234-35, 236 P.2d 987, 989 (1951).
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[T]he individual state and county officers [are] charged with the assess-
ment and collection of taxes. But, when those officers are incapable of
enforcing the same, either because of lack of ability or, as here, because
of conflicting elements, it then becomes the statutory duty of the Gov-
ernor as chief executive to effect their enforcement ....A failure on their part places the burden secondarily upon the shoul-
ders of the Governor .... 55
So, also, the Governor of Florida was held to be authorized, by implication
from his constitutional power to fill vacancies, to appoint a person to per-
form the functions of a sheriff and other executive officers, where no specific
regulations were provided and when the incumbent officer was absent due
to war service.5 6
This emergency exception is also consistent with governors' roles as com-
manders of state militias. All state constitutions provide for the establish-
ment and calling of a militia or a national guard, inter alia, to execute the
laws and preserve the peace, and bestow upon the governor the title of com-
mander-in-chief of these military forces.57 Although not one constitution says
so explicitly, it has long been held that the militia may not be called out
to execute the laws either by assisting civil authorities or, even more so,
55 Id. at 234-35, 236 P.2d at 989-90. See also to the same effect: State ex rel. Livingston
v. Graham, 25 La. Ann. 629, 630 (1873) (based on the duty of the Governor in the in-
terest of the State); State ex rel. Murray v. Pure Oil Co., 169 Okla. 507, 37 P.2d 608
(1934) (dictum); State v. Clausen, 146 Wash. 588, 264 P. 403 (1928) (taxpayer cannot re-
strain misapplication of state funds, since such function is reserved to the Governor).
See also In re B. Turecamo Contracting Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 258, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270,
275, appeal denied,.259 App. Div. 1094, 22 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1940). Note, however, that this
was not an ordinary intervention. The District Attorney's conduct was "reasonably called
into question."
56 In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 151 Fla. 44, 51-54, 9 So. 2d 172, 175 (1942).
See also In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 150 Fla. 556, 8 So. 2d 26 (1942). The
same rationale was followed respecting hiring by an officer on a lower echelon: Seward
v. State, 75 Idaho 467, 470-71, 274 P.2d 993, 995 (1954) (dictum). For a comparison with
the President's powers in emergency, see Kallenbach, supra note 30, at 480.
57 Ala. Const. art. XV, § 271; Ariz. Const. art. XVI, § 1; Ark. Const. art. XI, § I;
Colo. Const. art. XVII, § 1; Fla. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Ga. Const. art. X, § 1; Idaho
Const. art. XIV, § 1; Ill. Const. art. XII, § 1; Ind. Const. art. XII, § 1; Iowa Const.
art. VI, § 1; Mass. Const. pt. I, ch. II, § I, art. VII; Mich. Const. art. III, § 4; Miss.
Const. art. IX, § 214; Mont. Const. art XIV, § 1; N.C. Const. art. XII, §§ 1, 4; N.D.
Const. art. XIII, § 188; Neb. Const. art. XIV, § 1; N.M. Const. art. XVIII, § 1; N.Y.
Const. art. XII, § 1; Ohio Const. art. IX, § 1; Ore. Const. art. X, § 1; Pa. Const. art. 3,§ I; S.C. Const. art. XIII, § 1; S.D. Const. art. XV, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Utah
Const. art. XV, § 1; Vt. Const. ch. 2, § 55; Wash. Const. art. X, § 1; Wis. Const. art. IV,
§ 29; Wyo. Const. art. XVII, § 1; (the preceding provisions relate to the establishment of
the militia). Alas. Const. art. I, § 19; Hawaii Const. art. I, § 15; La. Const. art. I, § 8;
Md. Const. DR art. 28; N.H. Const. pt. 1 BR art. 24; Va. Const. art. 1, § 13; (the above
provisions contain a declaration of the necessity for establishing a militia). Cal. Const.
art. VIII, § 1; Kan. Const. art. VIII, § 4; Minn. Const. art. IV, § 4; Mo. Const. art. IV,
§ 6; Nev. Const. art. XII, § 2; Okla. Const. art. VI, § 6; Tex. Const. art. IV, § 7; (the
preceding provisions relate to the calling out of the militia). Conn. Const. art. IV, § 7;
Del. Const. art. III, § 7; Ky. Const. § 75; Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 7; N.J. Const. art.
V, § 1, 12; R.I. Const. art. VII, § 3; (the preceding provisions deal with the governor
as the commander of the militia). See also Holcombe, supra note 35, at 403, 404; Maddox
& Fuquay, supra note 29, at 90.
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by acting under martial law, unless local law enforcement agencies have
refused or completely failed to function. 58 According to a Florida court:
"In a democratic form of government like ours the military establishment
may be said to be the dernier resort of governmental authority, that is
never called upon except when all other civil authority fails and becomes
powerless to preserve public order."59 The Mississippi Supreme Court has
adopted the same rationale:
A permeating feature in our State Constitution, and in all State Con-
stitutions, is that primary local authority shall be preserved, so far as
practically possible .... It was foreseen, however, by the framers of the
Constitution that . . . local conditions would sometimes arise which
would render the local authorities powerless to enforce the laws, or un-
willing or afraid to do so. It was to meet such conditions, as one of its
purposes, that the constitutional and statutory authority.., in respect
to the execution of the laws was vested in the Governor. ..
It was never the purpose of the Constitution, therefore, that the mili-
tia should be sent to execute the laws, merely because they are not
being at all times diligently executed or perfectly enforced ....
[But if there occurs] a substantial breakdown of local enforcement,
then the power and duty of the Governor arises to send the executive
agents with which the law has armed him, to wit, the militia, not at
all to supersede the law, but to enforce it .... 60
In summary, subject to the exceptions noted above and absent a legis-
lative mandate, a governor's duties as the chief executive and his duty to
"take care that the laws be executed" are limited to overseeing, not neces-
sarily controlling, the executive machine. He must see that the machine
functions effectively; if it breaks down completely, he should take steps to
fill the void. If law enforcement breaks down completely, he must use the
58 See Rohr, supra note 17, at 100-02; Department of Law, Law Enforcement in Ken-
tucky, Report to the Committee on the Administration of Justice in the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, 52 Ky. L.J. 1, 184-5 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Law Enforcement in
Kentucky]; Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governors' Emergency Pow-
ers, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 290 (1965).
59 State ex rel. Milton v. Dickenson, 44 Fla. 623, 629, 33 So. 514, 516 (1902).
60 State v. McPhail, 182 Miss. 360, 371-74, 180 So. 387, 390-91 (1938). See also In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 74 Fla. 92, 77 So. 87 (1917); Begley v. Louisville Times
Co., 272 Ky. 805, 115 S.W.2d 345 (1938); McBride v. State, 221 Miss. 508, 516, 73 So. 2d
154, 157 (1954); Seaney v. State, 188 Miss. 367, 373, 194 So. 913, 915 (1940). The same
emphasis on local law enforcement was made by other courts: Wilson & Co. v. Freeman,
179 F. Supp. 520, 525 (D. Minn. 1959) (on the power of the Governor to declare martial
law and call the national guard); Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227 (E.D. Tex. 1932),
appeal dismissed, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (martial law can exist and military power exercised
over the property of citizens only when the civil arm of the government has completely
broken down) (dictum); Opinion of the Justices, 275 Ala. 547, 549, 156 So. 2d 639, 641
(1963); Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 240, 134 S.W. 484, 488 (1911) (the case dealt with the
responsibility of militia officers for unlawful, arrest); Brady v. State, 229 Miss. 677, 97 So.
2d 751 (1957); Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232 (1865) (the Governor, representing the sov-
ereign in the state is always present in the courts to execute process whenever the power
of the marshal and ordinary posse may not be sufficient for the purpose or when the
peace and dignity of the state may so require); Rose Mfg. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
251 S.W. 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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militia. Barring an emergency he may not act concurrently with other exec-
utive officers, except upon express legislative authority. This last conclusion
is strengthened by the actions of the governors themselves, both "weak" and
"strong" governors. They have resorted to popular and party support, through
which they achieved legislation authorizing control of the executive branch
and state budget. Few attempts have been made to get such control through
the courts or through the use of executive orders.61
II. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATORY AUTHORITY
What investigations then may a governor conduct or authorize? He may,
of course, exercise investigatory powers specifically granted to him, such as
seeking information that would facilitate his control over the executive
branch. For example, about three-fourths of the governors are constitu-
tionally authorized to require written reports from executive officers. 62
In addition, in a few states including Florida,63 he may be authorized
by statute to use subpoena powers to achieve specific regulatory func-
tions entrusted to him. Or he may be authorized by statute to function
as an investigator without subpoena powers. Oklahoma, for example, has
created a criminal investigation bureau, 64 one of the purposes of which is to
"investigate and detect criminal activity as directed by the Governor"; 65
Kansas has granted its Governor the power to appoint special investigators
to enforce the state liquor and criminal laws.66
If no legislative authority is available to compel disclosure, regulate, or
enforce the criminal laws, it seems that a governor is nonetheless empowered
to appoint investigators to gather information that would assist him in the
execution of his duties. Such appointees are not public officers; they are
merely fact-finders for the governor.6 7 They may be compared to agents and
fact-finding commissions that are appointed by Presidents from time to
time.68 Additionally, a governor may call upon a state officer endowed with
subpoena powers and request him to conduct an investigation, 69 but the
purpose of such investigations must be to obtain information to fill a legit-
imate need of the governor.70 Thus, an investigation into wrongdoing or
61 Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices For Administrative Direction and
Control, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 78 (1964).
62 Maddox & Fuquay, supra note 29, at 81.
63 Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials: A Study of Due Process Requirements in Adminis-
trative Investigations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 557, 575 (1964).
64 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 152 (1965).
65 Id. § 154.
66 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-116 (1964).
67 See pp. 642-44, infra, for criteria to distinguish public office.
68 Such appointments raised arguments of unauthorized creation of office. These were
rejected on the ground that the problem was not creation of office but permissible dele-
gation of fact finding functions to trusted friends. Kallenbach, supra note 30, at 381.
For the criteria used to identify "public officers," see pp. 643-44, infra.
69 In re Di Brizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 101 N.E.2d 464 (1951).
70 See, e.g., Winter v. Governor's Special Comm., 441 P.2d 370 (Okla. 1967). In this
case, a committee appointed under statute by the Governor to conduct investigations of
the state treasury was limited to statutory grant and purpose; there is no power in either
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negligence in the management of a state prison, 71 and an investigation into
the relationship between organized crime and state government, 72 were
deemed to be subjects into which a governor may inquire without legis-
lative authorization, since such an inquiry would tend to assist the governor
in the exercise of his duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed
and to report to the state legislature. 73
The Florida Supreme Court held that Section 14.06 of the Florida statutes
empowered the Governor to establish the War on Crime Program. The
pertinent part of the section reads:
And the governor is further authorized to employ such persons as may
be required from time to time to make investigations as may, in the
judgment of the governor, be necessary or expedient to efficiently con-
duct the affairs of state government, especially to make investigations
and report in matters of taxation and finance throughout the state.74
The court was of the opinion that these words were
sufficiently broad to warrant the employment by the Governor of per-
sons to investigate suspected racketeers, criminals and corruption in the
State because it stands to reason the affairs of the State cannot be con-
ducted "efficiently" in a climate of crime and corruption. [These were]
investigations for the 'Governor into alleged racketeering and official
corruption in the State.75
The court held that the Governor had authority to employ individuals
to serve only as his investigative agents for the purposes stated in the Gov-
ernor's letter, namely to assist him in his
constitutional duty in taking care that the laws be faithfully executed
and to insure that the life, liberty and property of the inhabitants of
the state be protected. Any information reflecting a violation of the
criminal laws of the state will be referred to local police authorities,
county solicitors, state attorneys, grand juries or other duly constituted
of the three branches of government to expose for the.sake of exposure. This committee
had subpoena powers, but the decision does not rest on the separation of powers doctrine.
The same limitation was applied to administrative agencies, 1 K. Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise, § 3.10 at 210 (1958). Note that the inherent power of Congress to investigate
is also limited to the purpose of furthering a legitimate task. Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957); United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956) (congressional
committee may investigate a murder but only for a legitimate legislative purpose, and
inviting the suspect to tell his side of the story is not such legitimate purpose). The
same limitation is applicable to state legislatures: State ex rel. Fatzer v. Anderson, 180
Kan. 120, 299 P.2d 1078 (1956); Sheridan v. Gardner, 347 Mass. 8, 196 N.E.2d 303 (1964);
Attorney General v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172, 171 N.E.2d 82 (1930); Nelson v. Wyman,
99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954); Richman v. Neuberger, 22 N.J. 28, 123 A.2d 217 (1956);
Note, Constitutional Law-Resolutions Authorizing State Legislative Investigations, 47
N.C.L. Rev. 700 (1969). The same rule is applicable to local legislatures: Eggers v. Kenny,
15 N.J. 107, 104 A.2d 10 (1954). This limitation is not based on the separation of powers
doctrine, even though the cases deal with use of subpoena powers. See also Morss v.
Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957); In re Bowers, 203 Misc. 653, 121 N.Y.S.2d 629
(1952), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 861, 119 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1953).
71 In re Investigating Comm'n, 16 R.I. 751, 11 A. 429 (1887).
72 In re Di Brizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 215-16, 101 N.E.2d 464, 468 (1951).
73 See note 70 supra.
74 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 14.06 (1961). See also discussion of this statute at pp. 646-47, infra.
75 State ex rel. Kirkland y, tirs, 198 So. 2d 331, 332 (Fla. 1967).
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instrumentalities of county, state or federal government for appropriate
action.7
No distinction was made by court or Governor between investigation of
particular crimes on the one hand and investigation of' the general crime
problem on the other hand, between specific racketeers or criminals and
general corruption, between enforcement of specific criminal laws and the
supervision of law enforcers' performances, between efficient conduct of the
affairs of state government and the apprehension and fining of a prostitute. 77
It can be assumed that the Supreme Court of Florida believed the Pro-
gram's investigations would tend to assist the Governor in the execution of
his duties.7 8 Since decisions in Florida 79 as elsewhere show that no gov-
ernor is cast in the role of a law enforcer by implication, query whether
the decision was intended to include the Program's investigations which
were subsequently conducted. The court's decisions could apply to both
the general subject of crime in the state, investigation of which would
assist the Governor in the execution of his duties, as well as to crimes com-
mitted by specific individuals, investigations of which would assist the law
enforcement agencies in the execution of their duties. This ambiguity was
not clarified by the court's emphasis that the investigators were confined to
investigations only.8 0 The emphasis might be misplaced. Whether or not
the investigations further the affairs of state government is determined by
the subject matter and purpose of the inquiry, rather than the use or ab-
sence of use of police powers. Subsequent events show that the Wackenhut
Corporation was indiscriminately investigating all types of law violations
for the purpose of bringing culprits to justice. Query whether Section 14.06
furnishes the required statutory authority for these activities.
III. LIMITATION ON LEGISLATIVE POWER TO AUTHORIZE INVESTIGATION
A. Concurrent Law Enforcement
Does the existence of constitutional and statutory law enforcement of-
ficers preclude the legislature from permitting the governor to employ crime
76 Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 1967).
77 Address by George Wackenhut, Annual Stockholders Meeting of the Wackenhut
Corp., April 24, 1967, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Wackenhut Address].
78 Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1967).
79 Op. Att'y Gen., March 2, 1967. See note 4, supra.
80 "In the absence of further definitive legislation they cannot exercise police powers."
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 1967). The same emphasis
was made regarding § 14.01. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 200 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla.
1967). On the contrary, it may be argued that if the Governor is authorized to employ
investigators of crimes to act as guardians of life, liberty and property, he should have
the authority, as a corollary, to equip them with the necessary tools to accomplish their
mission, and empower them to use police powers in order to achieve better results. More-
over, if this court-imposed limitation is aimed at avoiding conflicts between the regular
law enforcement agencies and the Program's investigators, this aim is not achieved
thereby. Conflicts would arise with the actual exercise of investigatory functions not with
a mere grant of power, B. Smith, Police Systems in the United States 24 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Smith].
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detectives to act concurrently with them? It seems that even though the
legislature is generally precluded from creating positions for the performance
of duties ordinarily executed by constitutional offices, law enforcement is an
exception.
In People v. Clampitt,8 an Illinois statute authorizing a court clerk to
issue a venire to either the coroner or the sheriff was interpreted to mean
that the, coroner could replace the sheriff only when the latter could not
act or was disqualified from acting. Since this function of the sheriff was
defined by the constitution, the legislature could add to but not detract
from it. Therefore, any other interpretation would have led to invalidation
of the statute.8 2 The same rationale was applied in Illinois and in New
York to the sheriff's constitutional duty to administer the county jail.8 3
Additionally, the existence of constitutionally elected officers may be inter-
preted as a limitation on legislative power to create appointive offices for the
performance of essentially similar functions. Thus, the Washington,8 4 Ohio s5
and North Dakota8 6 legislatures could not create an appointive office basi-
cally similar to the sheriff's.
It could be argued, therefore, that the existence of constitutional officers
whose duty is to detect crime should be interpreted to exclude the creation
of similar statutory offices, at least in states where the constitution creates
the duties of the sheriffs or other law enforcement officers. If the constitu-
tional duty of sheriffs to control and administer county jails was held exclu-
sive, why should the sheriffs' duty to investigate crimes not be exclusive
too? Logically this conclusion is attractive. It seems, however, that, with
respect to peace-keeping functions, concurrent law enforcement has always
been the rule rather than the exception. A great number of statutory and
constitutional officers entrusted with such crime prevention and detection
duties act concurrently.87 Hence, a sheriff has been denied an injunction
against national guardsmen acting as peace officers so long as they did not
interfere with him in the execution of his duties. The sheriff, said a Ken-
tucky court, had no monopoly on the right to keep the peace or to act as
a peace officer.
The judges ... the constables, policemen, and marshals are conservators
of the peace no less than the sheriff and his deputies. The same may
be said of the National Guardsmen when thus on active duty.88
These law enforcement agencies are not mutually exclusive; they com-
81 362 Ill. 534, 200 N.E. 832 (1936).
82 Id. at 536, 200 N.E. at 333.
83 People ex rel. Walsh v. Board of Comm'rs, 597 Ill. 293, 301, 74 N.E.2d 503, 508
(1947); People v. Keeler, 36 N.Y. 175 (1883).
84 State ex rel. Johnston v. Melton, 192 Wash. 379, 73 P.2d 134 (1937).
85 State ex rel. Armstrong v. Halliday, 61 Ohio 171, 55 N.E. 175 (1899).
86 Ex parte Corliss, 16 N.D. 470, 473, 114 N.W. 962, 964 (1907).
87 Maddox & Fuquay, supra note 29, at 519, 592-600; Phillips, supra note 18, at 459-
64; Smith, supra note 80, at 66-181.
88 Middleton v. Denhardt, 261 Ky. 134, 87 S.W.2d 139 (1935). See also Gilmore v.
Penobscot, 107 Me. 345, 78 A. 454 (1910).
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plement each other. In the area of law enforcement, the existence of
constitutional offices does not preclude the legislature from creating con-
current law enforcers or from authorizing the employment of crime
detectives, provided the constitutional officers are not hindered in executing
their duties.8 9 Moreover, the legislature may permit the hiring of private
investigators to supplement regular police work.90 Subject to inherent po-
lice power to regulate, every person may engage in crime detection.91 Every-
one is permitted to assist in law enforcement, nay, encouraged to do so.
The legislature, therefore, is not precluded from authorizing the governor
to investigate crimes.
B. Delegation of Public Functions to Private Persons
May the legislature permit the "farming out" of criminal investigations?
It seems that criminal investigation in the name of the state and for the
purpose of prosecuting offenders, without proper supervision and control
by a governmental agency, is a public duty that can be created only by the
legislature, 92 subject to constitutional requirements and performed only by
public officers. It appears that the Wackenhut Corporation could not be a
public officer, that its investigators were not public officers, and that neither
the legislature nor the Governor could authorize them to function as such.
1. Public Office
A great deal has been written about what constitutes a public office. In
the final analysis, the definition depends on the facts, circumstances and
context of each case. A function may be characteristic of a public office for
one purpose, and not for another.
To determine if the Program's investigators were public officers, and hence
if their position constituted a public office, one might compare the Program's
investigators with, the police, one of whose main functions is criminal in-
vestigations. The police have almost invariably been held to be public of-
ficers for a variety of purposes.98 In Missouri, for example, the position of
traffic officer was held to be a public office that could be created only by
89 State ex rel. Balser v. Bowen, 111 Ohio 561, 146 N.E. 108 (1924).
90 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 429 (1947); Smith, supra note 80,
at 66, 93-95, 100. See generally Note, Regulation of Private Police, 40 S. Cal. L. Rev. 540
(1967).
91 See generally note 90 supra.
92 Under the Constitution of the United States the power to create offices was reserved
to Congress. U.S. Const. art. II § 2. Even though it is not clear that Congress can dele-
gate such power, it has done so in the past. Corwin, supra note 24, at 70, 72; Schwartz,
supra note 24, at 40. On the state level, since legislatures have plenary powers except
as limited by the Constitution, power to create offices is deemed vested in them. Shlylie
v. Williams, 81 Idaho 335, 341 P.2d 451 (1959); Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d
270 (1941); Phillips, supra note 18, at 185. The power to create the office of traffic squad
policemen was vested in the legislature and could not be delegated. State ex rel. Field
v. Smith, 329 Mo. 1019, 49 S.W.2d 74 (1932).
98 Woldby, The Public Officer-Public Employee Distinction in Florida, 9 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 47 n.31 (1956). See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R. 309 (1933).
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the legislature.9 4 In Florida, the position of county detective, 95 and in Ken-
tucky, the position of chief of police,96 were held to be public offices, the
duration of which must comply with the constitutional requirements.
What tests should be applied to determine the existence of a public
office? First, discretion in the exercise of duties is one criterion. Therefore,
a ministerial function, however awesome, 97 and an advisory position, how-
ever expert,98 are not public offices. Second, the nature of the function,
rather than the powers bestowed, is an indication of the existence of an
office.99 Function, rather than the mode of appointment, is also determina-
tive for the purpose of removal from a public office. 00 Third, the most
frequently cited criterion is whether the position entails an exercise of a
"portion of sovereign power."'101
If function and the exercise of sovereign power be a guide, the preserva-
tion of peace in the name of the state is a public office.' 02 Criminal inves-
tigations, as much as arrests, are an exercise of a "portion of sovereign
power" when conducted for the state. Such investigations constitute an in-
dispensable activity of a law enforcement agency. 03 If discretion be a guide,
94 State v. Smith, 329 Mo. 1019, 49 S.W.2d 74 (1932).
95 State ex rel. Watson v. Hulbert, 155 Fla. 531, 20 So. 2d 693 (1945) (for the same
reason the post of state veterinarian was held to be a public office). See also Blackburn
v. Brorein, 70 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1954) (deputy sheriff was an officer for the purpose of
determining whether a civil service statute that purported to apply to such sheriff was
constitutional); Curry v. Hammond, 154 Fla. 63, 15 So. 2d 523 (1944) (city police patrol-
man was officer; earnings obtained during suspension could not be set off from salary
due to him upon reinstatement); McSween v. State Livestock Sanitary Bd., 97 Fla. 750,
122 So. 239 (1929); Klam v. Boehm, 72 Idaho 259, 240 P.2d 484 (1952) (chief of police
was an officer for the purpose of deciding whether he was liable for tortious acts of his
subordinates); State v. Hord, 264 N.C. 149, 141 S.E.2d 241 (1965) (policeman was officer
for purpose of a North Carolina statute making willful and corrupt neglect to discharge
a duty by an officer a misdemeanor). Contra, Blynn v. City of Pontiac, 185 Mich. 35, 151
N.W. 681 (1915); Attorney General ex rel. Hart v. Cain, 84 Mich. 223, 47 N.W. 484
(1890); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 309 (1933) (position of a policeman serving at the pleasure of
a local council was not an officer whose title could be tested by quo warranto proceed-
ings).
96 Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1952).
97 Blitch v. Buchanan, 100 Fla. 809, 131 So. 151 (1930) (public executioner).
98 But cf. State ex rel. Pickett v. Truman, 333 Mo. 1018, 64 S.W.2d 105 (1933); State
ex inf. McKittrick v. Bode, 342 Mo. 162, 113 S.W.2d 805 (1938).
99 State ex rel. Black v. Burch, 226 Ind. 445, 80 N.E.2d 294 (1948).
100 La Polla v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 71 N.J. Super. 264, 176 A.2d 821 (1961).
101 State ex rel. Halloway v. Sheats, 78 Fla. 583, 587, 83 So. 508, 509 (1919); Schobert
v. Inter-County Drainage Bd., 342 Mich. 270, 69 N.W.2d 814 (1955).
102 Maddox & Fuquay, supra note 29, at 592:
Governments perform many functions in the interest of the well-being of society.
Arguments have been raised over the question of whether some function ought to
be performed by government, but rarely if ever are objections heard to governmental
attention to public safety.
See also cases cited at notes 95 & 96 supra.
103 In Georgia, for example, a person exercising or attempting to exercise without
authority, the functions of certain designated peace officers is guilty of a misdemeanor.
In Burke v. State, 76 Ga. App. 612, 47 S.E.2d 116 (1948), the court upheld an indictment
consisting, inter alia, of patrolling with arms along a public street for the purpose of
enforcing the ordinances of the city of Atlanta, entering a former public school for the
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criminal investigations, per se, entail a large measure of discretion. It is
the nature of such investigations that they do not lend themselves to dis-
tant control.
[D]etectives go their own ways, operating in a sphere where the ordi-
nary administrative checks and disciplinary methods do not apply, en-
joying an almost unregulated discretion in the use and application of
their efforts, and sometimes thrown largely upon their own resources. 104
This was said about the police. It is doubly forceful when applied to the
Wackenhut investigators.
Under the Program, the investigators exercised substantial, if somewhat
inexplicit, discretionary decisional powers that must have affected the gen-
eral population of the state, as well as the particular individuals whose ac-
tivities were under investigation. It does not seem that they were restricted
to complaints. They could decide whether or not to start inquiries or con-
tinue investigations. They could, for example, initiate investigations of those.
they defined to be "radicals," "subversive elements," or "organized crime."
The investigators also had discretion regarding whether to initiate criminal
prosecution or close the file. 105
It is not clear whether and to what extent private individuals are under
a duty to enforce the law in the sense of transmitting information of the
commission of crimes to law enforcement agencies. If such a duty exists,
it is rarely enforced against persons who are not implicated in the commis-
sion of the crime. On the other hand, law enforcement officers are under a
duty to so enforce the law. It is known that they do not do so indiscrim-
inately. They exercise a great measure of discretion as to whether or not
to initiate investigation, arrest and prosecution or close the file, especially
with regard to lesser offenses. Even in the hands of the police, such dis-
cretion raises questions because of the potential for abuse.106 In the hands
of private persons, not subject to police discipline and apparent public
control, such power is formidable. Here are persons who assist the state in
collecting information about individuals, without a clear legal duty to
transmit such information to law enforcement agencies.
It is submitted that the Program's investigators were performing functions
of public officers not only because of the nature of their function and the
degree of their discretion, but mainly because of the potential impact of,
their activities on the people of Florida. In the context of criminal inves-
tigations, the main criterion of a public office should be the actual degree
purpose of making an investigation into an alleged rape and attempting to identify the
alleged criminal and attempting to arrest him. These functions were held to be the
functions of the police force in Atlanta. Policemen were then held to be officers for the
purpose of these functions. See Smith, supra note 80, at 122-23. See also Ostenburg,
The Investigative Process, 59 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 152 (1968).
104 Smith, supra note 80, at 240.
105 Fact Sheet at 5.
106 The 50 States and their Local Government 456 (J. Fesler ed. 1967); Barker, Police
Discretion and the Precept of Legality, 8 Crim. L.Q. 400 (1966); Smith, supra note 80,
at 19, 136.
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of the power to interfere with the rights of people. It is the actual power and
its potential abuse, not the powers officially granted, that should be decisive.
The fewer official powers the investigators have, the more they may be in-
clined to resort to questionable means of gleaning information. The more
ambitious they are, the greater the temptation to obtain incriminating
evidence regardless of the rights of others. It may be assumed that the in-
vestigators used the same methods to which they were accustomed as pri-
vate detectives. The use of undercover agents, for example, has raised con-
cern even when employed by the police. 107 There is all the more cause for
concern when used by unsupervised private detectives.
Many investigations are a mild or severe form of harassment. An investiga-
tion does not always take the form of questioning only a particular suspect.
Sometimes he may be the last to be questioned. Others connected with him,
in private life or business activities, may be approached first. His affairs
may be probed into; gossipers may be encouraged; informers may be initi-
ated into the art; he may be followed; his family and friends come under
surveillance. Harassment by a private detective might be checked through
appeal to law enforcement agencies. However, harassment by a private de-
tective, who is "commissioned" by the governor to act for the state and
with whom law enforcement agencies are requested by the governor to co-
operate, is a different matter, even though legal private remedies might be
available in an extreme case. 108
Harassment aside, the accumulation of information about a person's af-
fairs may tend to encroach upon a right to privacy, broader than the tra-
ditional "interest of secrecy, physical integrity and seclusion."'109 This is a
right not to have anyone pry into our everyday life, habits and activities. 110
It is a right to determine if and to what degree our private affairs will be-
come known to others. This kind of right is in great danger when private
individuals are permitted by the government to investigate and gather, in
the name of the state, information about any person who they deem sus-
picious.
Police are subject to special legal restraints because of the potential for
abuse of their power and because of the power of their discretion. It is not
certain whether the Wackenhut investigators were under the same restraints.
For example, it is not clear whether and to what extent such investigators
are under a duty to advise a suspect in custody, whether legal custody or
not, of his constitutional rights."' There is sufficient authority to suggest
107 Note, Police Undercover Agents, 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 634 (1969).
108 See generally S. Hofstadter & G. Horowitz, The Right of Privacy (1964).
109 Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82
Harv. L. Rev. 400, 407 (1968).
110 Id. at 408.
ill Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964). Most state courts have held that confessions received by private detectives and
security guards are admissible without a Miranda or Escobedo warning, at least when
a regular policeman is not present. People v. Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1967); People v. Crabtree, 239 Cal. App. 2d 789, 49 Cal. Rptr. 285, (1966);
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that such a duty is not imposed upon them and that confessions obtained
without proper warning would be admisssible."12 It is not clear whether
a voluntary confession of a suspect who was stopped and questioned by
such investigators is admissible. Would the answer depend upon their
flashing before him or concealing from him their "commission"? 113 Further,
it is not clear whether the investigators were acting under the color of
law within the meaning of the federal criminal law.114 In Williams v.
United States,115 an operator of a detective agency possessing a special po-
lice officer's card issued by the city of Miami, Florida, was held to be
acting under the color of law when, in the presence of a regular police-
man, he had extracted a confession by violence. It is not certain whether
the Governor's "commission" could be considered equal to Miami's
special police card, "a semblence of policemen's power from Florida,""16 and
how the investigators would fare under the circumstances of the Williams
case. Further, would their actions constitute a "state action" within the
meaning of the 14th amendment? Are they public officers for the purpose
of taking a bribe? Are they subject to laws which punish public officials for
refusing to execute their duties?117
The possibility that the above questions will produce different answers in
the case of private parties than with respect to public officers leads to the
conclusion that the functions which the investigators carried out were
those of public officers.
2. Delegation
The Florida Supreme Court seems to have followed the principle that the
Governor's power to employ the Wackenhut Corporation and establish the
War on Crime Program must be based not only on the "take care" pro-
vision but also on additional statutory authorization."18 The Court found
this additional authority in Sections 14.01 and 14.06 of the Florida Statutes.
The former states that
[t]he Governor may employ as many persons as he, in his discretion,
may deem necessary to procure and secure protection of life, liberty and
Knott v. State, 243 Ind. 501, 187 N.E.2d 571 (1963); State v. Robinson, 86 N.J. Super.
308, 206 A.2d 779 (1965); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968);
People v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Triamarco,
41 Misc. 2d 775, 245 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1963); see also 1 Antieau, supra note 24, at
§ 5.99 (1969).
112 Note, Criminal Law-Admissibility of Confessions or Admission of Accused Ob.
tained During Custodial Interrogation by Non-Police Personnel: Are the Miranda Warn-
ings Required?, 40 Miss. L.J. 139 (1968). But cf. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968) (holding that an Internal Revenue agent must give a Miranda warning during in-
custody interrogation).
113 Compare with the position of the police: Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Adminis-
trative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 Denver L.J. 389, 414 (1966).
114 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
115 341 U.S. 97, 98 (1951).
116 Id. at 100.
117 State v. Hord, 264 N.C. 149, 141 S.E.2d 241 (1965).
118 See pp. 629, 639 supra.
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property of the inhabitants of the state, also to protect the property of
the state.1 19
Query whether this section is sufficiently explicit to authorize the Gover-
nor's appointment of a crime investigation force functioning as did the
Program's investigators. Moreover, this section may raise a serious delega-
tion problem if it be interpreted to grant authority to private persons to
exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying the law. 2 0
The rule against delegation of public authority to private groups has
been invoked on the state level more frequently and more successfully than
on the federal level. 121 It could be argued that the Wackenhut Corporation
was given public power and governmental power to enforce criminal laws,
and that the functions which its investigators carried out could not be del-
egated to a private corporation. However, history furnishes examples of
somewhat similar delegations that were upheld by the courts. During the
twenties, for example, legislative acts entrusted societies for the prevention
of cruelty to animals with the enforcement of laws regulating the owner-
ship and keeping of dogs. Such acts were held not to be unconstitutional
because of unlawful delegation. The activities of the societies for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children were also upheld.122 The reasons for the de-
cisions were diverse: that such functions were administrative 23 or merely
ministerial, similar to garbage collection, 24 and that the societies were not
private corporations but agencies organized under special laws.125 All deci-
sions aver that "strictly governmental powers cannot be conferred upon a
corporation or individual."'126 In Fox v. Mohawk & Hudson River Humane
Society,127 the court, after holding an act granting the society's law enforce-
119 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 14.01 (as amended 1965). See also discussion of this statute at
p. 639 supra.
120 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 250, 380 P.2d 34,
42-43 (1962); Lewis v. Florida State Bd. of Health, 143 So. 2d 867, 875 (Fla. 1962) (invali-
dating regulations of State Board of Health regarding spraying of lawns); Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Anderson, 74 Sb. 2d 544 (Fla. 1954) (invalidating power of administrative
official to decide when the operation of a business is injurious to personnel); State v.
Fowler, 94 Fla. 752, 114 So. 435 (1927) (invalidating a building code); Lewis Consol.
School Dist. v. Johnston, 256 Iowa 236, 247, 127 N.W.2d 118, 125 (1964); Opinion of the
Justices, 315 Mass. 761, 52 N.E.2d 974, 978 (1944); McKibbin v. Corporation & Sec.
Comm'n, 369 Mich. 69, 82, 119 N.W.2d 557, 562 (1963).
121 Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups,
67 Harv. L. Rev. 1398 (1954). See also Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 Harv. L.
Rev. 201, 231-32 (1937); Note, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Groups, 32
Colum. L. Rev. 80, 92-93 (1932).
122 People ex rel. State Bd. of Charities v. The New York Soc'y for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children, 161 N.Y. 233, 56 N.E. 1004 (1900). In that case, however, the issue
was whether public money could be paid to the society.
123 American Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New York, 205 App. Div.
335, 199 N.Y.S. 728 (1923); People ex rel. Westbay v. Delaney, 73 Misc. 5, 130 N.Y.S. 833
(Sup. Ct. 1911).
124 Storey v. City of Seattle, 124 Wash. 598, 215 P. 514 (1923).
125 American Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New York, 205 App. Div.
335, 199 N.Y.S. 728 (1923).
126 Id. at 341, 199 N.Y.S. at 733.
127 165 N.Y. 517, 59 N.E. 353 (1901).
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ment powers unconstitutional but rejecting the argument of unlawful
delegation, stated, in dictum:
If it were necessary for the disposition of this case . . . I certainly
should deny the right of the legislature to vest in private associations
or corporations authority and power affecting the life, liberty and prop-
erty of the citizens, except that of eminent domain ... and the manage-
ment and control of reformatory institutions to which persons may be
committed by the judicial or other public authorities. There may be
other exceptions, but they do not occur to me. Of course, the state...
may employ individuals or corporations to do work or render service for
it; but the distinction between a public officer and a public employee or
contractor is plain and well recognized. 128
The distinction was based on Voluntary membership in the private society
and on the absence of state supervision over management and membership
of the society. These distinctions are of little value as a guide in other
specific cases. 129 A survey of the decisions may suggest that courts tend to
permit delegation to a private delegate when the likelihood of abuse is
minimized, as where some control is retained by state authorities and when
the delegated powers have been traditionally exercised by private groups
and are accepted as beneficial to society. For example, pursuant to the Fox
decision, the New York statute was amended to meet the objections voiced
in the decision. The statute was then upheld by the New York Supreme
Court 18 0 and approved of by the Supreme Court of the United States,131
which said that the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to An-
imals was organized
to enforce the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to animals [and] has
long been recognized by the legislature as a valuable and efficient aid
toward the enforcement of those laws .... And when the State in the
reasonable conduct of its own affairs chooses to entrust the work inci-
dent to such licenses and collection of fees to a corporation created by
it for the express purpose of aiding in law enforcement, and in good
faith appropriates the funds so collected for payment of expenses fairly
incurred . . . there is no infringement of any right guaranteed to the
individual by the Federal Constitution.132
However, where procedural checks are insufficient and potential abuse
great, state courts have intervened. Thus, in Group Health Insurance v.
Howell,'8 ' it was held that the medical society, a private corporation, could
not be granted exclusive power to determine who will engage in the busi-
128 Id. at 524-25, 59 N.E. at 356.
129 Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups,
67 Harv. L. Rev. 1398, 1408 (1954).
130 People ex rel. Westbay v. Delaney, 73 Misc. 5, 130 N.Y.S. 833 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 146
App. Div. 957, 131 N.Y.S. 1137 (1911). But cf. Coler v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals, 122 N.Y.S. 549 (Sup. Ct. 1908), a decision which remained a minority.
131 Nicchia v. People, 254 U.S. 228 (1920).
132 Id. at 230-31.
13 40 NJ. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
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ness of a medical services corporation. Such power could not be delegated
to a
private body which . .. is not subject to public accountability, at least
where the exercise of such power is not accompanied by adequate leg-
islative standards or safeguards whereby an applicant may be protected
against arbitrary or self-motivated action on the part of such private
body.13 4
It is submitted that under the Program public power was unlawfully
delegated to private hands.13 5 There can be no objection to legislation that
authorizes the employment of private crime detectives to assist law enforce-
ment as employees, 36 or to the use of such detectives as independent con-
tractors, for example, as informers. As employees they act on behalf of the
state and are subject to the control of state officials. As independent con-
tractors they act on their own behalf and are not subject to control by the
state. The objection to the Florida scheme is that the investigators were
acting on behalf of the state, exercising official functions, but employed by
and subject to the control of a private corporation. True, they reported to
Mr. Wackenhut, who wore both the hat of the President of the Wackenhut
Corporation and the hat of the Director of the Program, but they reported
to him as the former and not as the latter.
Just as independent contractors could not act as public officers, neither
could the Wackenhut Corporation have acted as such an officer. This ob-
jection is not based exclusively on the view that corporations cannot take
an oath of office.
[The] chief objection is that the corporations are private in the sense
that they proceed from the voluntary action of individual citizens alone
... that the agents or officers of the corporation are appointed such by
the corporators, and that, if such agents are invested by virtue of their
agency alone with the power of public officers, it is in substance de-
volving the choice of public offices on a few of the citizens . . . while
under the Constitution, all public officers must be elected or appointed
by other public authorities .... 1 7
Today, private corporations may be granted the power to perform public
functions. Many a commission and an authority have been set up as proper
134 Id. at 445, 193 A.2d at 108; accord, Fink v. Cole, 302 N.Y. 216, 97 N.E.2d 873 (1951).
135 Dade County v. State, 95 Fla. 465, 116 So. 72 (1928); Bullock v. Billheimer, 175
Ind. 428, 438-39, 94 N.E. 763, 767 (1911); Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 557, 580-82,
185 A.2d 135, 149-50 (1962). See also Ex parte Kelly, 45 Okla. 577, 146 P. 444 (1915) on
authorized appointment of Special Assistant to the District Attorney, where full dele-
gation of functions plus management and control was invalidated, and Commonwealth
ex rel. Schumaker v. New York & Pennsylvania Co., 378 Pa. 359, 106 A.2d 239 (1954)
(invalidating an appointment of a special district attorney as an attempt to abdicate a
power vested exclusively in public officials). But note that a judicial appointment of
special assistants to the district attorney to meet an emergency was upheld on the
ground that the judge had inherent powers to make such appointments under these
conditions. Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Super. 107, 14 A.2d 907 (1940).
136 See, e.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 7-4-2 (1966); Smith, supra note 80, at 93.
137 Fox v. Mohawk & H.R. Humane Soc'y, 165 N.Y. 517, 525, 59 N.E. 353, 355 (1901
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tools for road construction and port administration. The above words of
the Fox decision, however, are relevant even today. Wherever private cor-
porations were set up as law enforcers, there remained a great measure of
control over their operation by governmental agencies and the public. More-
over, they were established for a public, not a private purpose.138 The
Wackenhut Corporation was established for the private purpose of conduct-
ing a detective and security business, and its position vis-it-vis the state was
that of an independent contractor. Section 14.01139 did not and could not
authorize the retainer of a private corporation as an independent contractor
for the performance of a public office.
IV. MERITS AND DISADVANTAGES
Over all these considerations looms the larger policy question: Should a
governor, even if permitted by law, employ an investigatory force to perform
the functions of crime detection? Should he, even if he could, employ an
independent contractor to provide investigators and a dollar-a-year man to
head a Florida-type program?
A. The Tradition of Local Law Enforcement
Powers of government, including law enforcement, were traditionally
vested in local authorities. 140 The history of our law enforcement shows a
strong and continuous resistance to the establishment of a centralized state 41
or federal 42 agency to perform regular police duties. This attitude is uni-
versal in this country and can be traced to Great Britain, from whom we
obtained, for better or for worse, the model for our law enforcement
agencies.143
The amazing maze of agencies and officers engaged in law enforcement
within states, their myriad powers and duties, and the marked absence of
centralized control, evidence their unplanned birth and growth. Such un-
planned growth was the result of both the pressing needs of changing times
and the obstinate clinging to familiar forms and old fears. The list of of-
ficers and institutions entrusted with the task of criminal investigation is
long: sheriffs, constables, marshals, coroners and grand juries; attorney gen-
erals, county attorneys, district attorneys, and prosecuting attorneys; county
138 State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 185, 60 N.W.2d 873 (1953).
139 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 14.01 (1964).
140 2 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 85-98 (Bradley ed. 1956) [hereinafter
cited as de Tocqueville].
141 Smith, supra note 80, at 304.
142 Note the attempt of President Coolidge, which met with violent protests in the
Senate, to unite federal and state liquor law enforcement agencies. It was assailed as
"an attempt to convert state and local officials into a federal police force." J. Kallenbach,
The American Chief Executive 446 (1966). See also Note, Riot Control and the Use of
Federal Troops, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 645-46 (1968).
143 A. Lee, A History of Police in England, ch. 12 (1901); Hall. Police and Law in a
Democratic Society, 28 Ind. L.J. 133 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Hall]. Smith, supra note
80, at 305 suggests that we have gone farther than the English in decentralizing our
law enforcement efforts.
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police and city. police; state police and state officials whose duty it is to
enforce statutes under their jurisdiction. 44
By and large, the main urban crime investigation agency in states is the
city police department. Such a department is invariably the creation of stat-
ute. It is significant that the establishment of city police departments was not
accomplished without a struggle. The legal attacks on statutes regulating
such police departments were based mainly on the argument that the state
legislature transgressed the boundaries of the state constitutional rights to
local self-government. Courts, however, invariably held that enforcement
of the law and preservation of peace were matters of state concern and
within the authority of state legislatures. Therefore, they could regulate
police departments in the cities and counties, and impose upon local au-
thorities the duty to finance their operation. 14 But state operation of local
police departments did not last. Disappointment with anticipated improve-
ment resulted in reestablishment of local control. 146
The beginning of this century also saw the appearance of statutory state
police. When the sheriff and constable reigned supreme as law enforcement
officers, their main occupation was the apprehension of criminals, the ex-
ecution of court orders and the collection of taxes. With the concentration
of population in the towns, with mobility and loss of close personal rela-
tionship between the law enforcement officer and the inhabitants, criminal
investigation was elevated to prominence. Crime laboratories, identification
libraries and expert criminal detection became indispensable to law enforce-
ment activities. These, however, could not be satisfactorily provided by local
law enforcement agencies, hence the development of the metropolitan and
state police.147 Yet even state police, though authorized, refrain from acting
in areas where locally controlled city police are active.' 48
Law enforcement in the states is fragmentized both functionally and ad-
ministratively.1 49 When faced with new problems, instead of strengthening
constitutionally created law enforcement offices whenever they have proved
unsatisfactory, 5 0 the tendency has been to create new agencies and endow
144 Maddox & Fuquay. supra note 29, at 519, 592-600; Phillips, supra note 18, at
459-74; Smith, supra note 80, at 66-181.
145 Mayor & City Council v. State ex rel. Bd. of Police, 15 Md. 376 (1860); Rohr,
supra note 17, at 140; Arnett v. State ex rel. Donohue, 168 Ind. 180, 80 N.E. 153 (1907);
State ex rel. Atwood v. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578, 17 P. 177, 180 (1888). See also Board of
Trustees of Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Fund v. Paducah, 333 S.W2d 515 (Ky.
1960); People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 (1865); Gooch v. Town of Exeter,
70 N.H. 413, 48 A. 1100 (1901); People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857).
146 See generally Law Enforcement in Kentucky, supra note 58, at 71.
147 Law Enforcement in Kentucky, supra note 58, at 125-6 (twenty-six states have state
police, 23 have highway patrols). Some laws permit cities to contract with state police
for police services. E.g., La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1388 (1951).
148 Maddox & Fuquay, supra note 29, at 599.
149 Task Force Report: The Police, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice 69 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
150 This is true especially in the metropolitan area. On the poor performance of the
sheriff-constable system, see Smith, supra note 80, at 579; Maddox & Fuquay, supra note
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them with the powers of peace officers.151 The reasons are not hard to find.
Traditionally, law and order was enforced by the people, not superimposed
from above by a ruler.152 To bear arms in defense of home and state is con-
sidered a right that some states thought worthy of constitutional protec-
tion.153 There is also a popular belief, whether justified or not, that police
abuse their power.15 4 Finally, there is a deep-rooted suspicion of any con-
centration of power.15 By investing local government with. control over law
enforcement, two interrelated results were achieved: decentralization of the
police force, and its control by the populace or, at least, by the governmental
unit that is the least removed from the -voter. These results may hamper
efficient police operation, but they are effective means of preventing the
creation of a large police unit dominated by a potential despot; a private
army. 156
Notwithstanding expert opinion to the contrary, popular sentiment against
a centralized police force is not dead.157 It is submitted that as a matter of
policy a grant of power to a governor to organize an investigative force to
ferret out information about crimes may require a basic change in the
attitudes and beliefs of the citizens of his state and a clear expression of
such change.
29 at 519. For a discussion of the problems and some of the solutions see Misner,
Recent Developments in Metropolitan Law Enforcement, 50 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 497
(1959-60), 51 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 265 (1960-61).
151 Smith, supra note 80, at 151-53. See generally Law Enforcement in Kentucky
supra note 59, at 114-24.
152 Hall, supra note 143, at 135.
153 Ala. Const. art. I, § 26; Alas. Const. art. I, § 19; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 26; Ark.
Const. art. II, § 5; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 12 & 13; Conn. Const. art. I, § 17; Fla. Const.
D.R., § 20; Ga. Const. art. I, § I, 22; Hawaii Const. art. I, § 15; Idaho Const. art. I,
§ 11; Ind. Const. art. I, § 32; Ky. Const. art. 1; La. Const. art. I, § 8; Me. Const. art. I,
§ 16; Mass. Const. D.R., § XVII; Mich. Const. art. II, § 5; Miss. Const. art. III, § 12;
Mo. Const. art. I, § 23; Mont. Const. art. III, § 13; N.M. Const. art. II, § 6; N.C. Const.
art. I, § 24; Ohio Const. art. I, § 4; Okla. Const. art. II, § 26; Ore. Const. art. I, § 27;
Pa. Const. art. I, § 21; R.I. Const. art. I, § 22; S.C. Const. art. I, § 26; S.D. Const. art.
VI, § 24; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 26; Tex. Const. art. I, § 23; Utah Const. art. I, § 6;
Vt. Const. art. I, § 16; Wash. Const. art. I, § 24; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 24.
154 Smith, supra note 80, at 328. See also Phillips, supra note 18, at 466-67; id. at
474 (on resentment of "outside" police intervention and the limited extent of use of
state police).
155 "The presence of armed troops in times of peace is a demonstration of centralized
power which sets up fear in the ordinary citizen that his constitutional liberties are
somehow being imperiled. Too much history of the past casts its shadow for the people
to feel otherwise." State v. McPhail, 182 Miss. 360, 373, 180 So. 387, 390 (1938). See also
Task Force Report, supra note 149, at 7.
156 See note 155 supra.
157 Neither is it dead in England. Chappel, Regional Crime Squads, 1965 Crim. L.
Rev. 5, 7, 8 (1965). See also Pollard, The Police Act 1964, Pub. L. 35 (1966); Regan, The
Police Service: An Extreme Example of Central Control Over Local Authority, Pub. L.
13 (1966), in which the author reaches the conclusion that notwithstanding the Home
Secretary's enormous powers, the Home Office "[e]vinces great reluctance to prevent local
police authorities from doing what they wish."-
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B. Conflict of Interests and Public Policy
By definition, the Wackenhut Corporation was an independent contrac-
tor in its relation to the state. 158 The main characteristic distinguishing an
independent contractor from an employee is the relative freedom from super-
vision of the details of his work. The employment of an independent con-
tractor by government has been justified when those services are of a non-
governmental and transient nature, because the public does not identify
the government with the contractor and, therefore, there is no need for
supervision over the manner in which the contractor operates. 159 Yet, in the
case of the investigatory services rendered by the Wackenhut Corporation,
the manner in which the investigators performed their duties was just as
important as the results that they produced, not only because the manner
of operation may have had a direct impact on the use and admissibility of
the evidence gathered, but also because the public did identify them with
the government. The investigations, which were conducted on behalf of the
state, and not just the results thereof, must have been attributed to the state.
Moreover, the functions of the investigators were not transitory and their
tenure not limited.160
The position of the investigators was unique: They worked in the offices
of the Program, a few miles away from the building where other investi-
gators of the Wackenhut Corporation were located.'"' They were paid by
the Wackenhut Corporation and, it seems, were not necessarily engaged
exclusively in work for the Program, as evidenced by the Director's strong
admonition not to use the credentials given to them by the Governor to
obtain information in connection with investigations conducted by the
Corporation for private clients. 16 2
In general, he who is employed by the government should be paid by the
government. 16 This rule is a derivative of the prohibition on serving two
masters.164 It is also based on public policy considerations that apply to
federal and state government alike. The receipt of payment from an outside
source by one rendering services to the state causes split loyalty and a like-
lihood of a conflict of interests. An outsider obtains a hold over the state
employee, who may then tend to favor this outsider over others. In Florida,
such a conflict may have arisen whenever a complaint against the Wacken-
158 See generally F. Mechem, Outline of Agency 290-91 (4th ed. 1952); R. Powell,
The Law of Agency 9 (2d ed. 1961).
159 Conflict of Interest and Federal Service, The Association of the Bar in the City
of New York, Special Committee on Federal Conflict of Interest Laws and Federal In-
terests, 239 (1960) [hereinafter cited as CIF].
160 The term of the investigators was to expire "[w]hen the cancer of crime is
removed ...." Address by Governor Claude Kirk, Inauguration of Governor of Florida,
Jan. 3, 1967 [hereinafter cited as Governor's Address].
161 Fact Sheet at 3.
162 Id. at 4.
163 CIF, supra note 159, at 58.
164 F. Mechem, Outline of Agency § 501 (4th ed. 1952).
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
hut Corportation or its employees would have been investigated by the War
on Crime Program (but such a possibility was remote). More probable was
the danger of abuse of power for private gains by the investigators, the Di-
rector or their colleagues in the Corporation. In Re Stanley' 65 held that it
was against public policy to allow a person clothed with special authority,
such as a constable, to act simultaneously as a private detective. The court
emphasized the extraordinary powers of the constable that are not conferred
on private individuals, namely to arrest and to carry arms, and concluded
that "[t]o give these powers . .. to a person licensed to act for private
persons, creates the distinct possibility of grave abuses."'166 Even though the
Director and his investigators had no power to arrest or to carry arms, this
rationale applied to them because of their extraordinary powers of inves-
tigation.
The danger of abuse did not escape the Director. He took steps to segre-
gate the War on Crime investigators from their counterparts in the Corpora-
tion by removing them to offices a few miles apart. He issued strict orders to
regular Wackenhut Corporation personnel, requiring them to advise all
persons whom they might interrogate while conducting investigations for
the corporation's private clients that the matter under investigation was not
part of the Governor's War on Crime.167
One may question the advisability and effect of these precautions. In the
era of the telephone and the car, the few miles between offices is not a sig-
nificant distance. Furthermore, since the Program's investigators were not
full-time employees, they probably spent the rest of their working time with
the regular investigators. The segregation was, therefore, more apparent
than real. As far as the warning is concerned, this negative assertion proves
one of the main dangers in the Governor's arrangement. It served as an
announcement to an uncooperative interviewee that the Wackenhut Cor-
portation was retained by the Governor, in the event that he was not aware
of that fact. Human nature being what it is, a negative assertion that a
particular individual was not engaged in general investigation for the Gov-
ernor amounted to a positive assertion that the corporation that employed
him was. Who would risk the displeasure of a private detective who might,
next time he came around, present credentials stating that he was the official
representative of the Governor?168 This negative assertion was also a very
valuable bonus to the Wackenhut Corporation. It provided a unique dis-
tinction, free publicity and a further possibility for conflict of interest. On
April 24, 1967, Mr. Wackenhut told the shareholders of the corporation:
165 204 Pa. Super. 29, 201 A.2d 287 (1964).
166 Id. at 32, 201 A.2d at 289. Note that both sheriffs and constables are permitted to
practice other professions, Smith, supra note 80, at 72.
167 Fact Sheet at 3.
168 See State Lodge of Mich. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Detroit, 318 Mich. 182,
27 N.W.2d 612 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 818 (1947); Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris,
306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W.2d 310 (1934).
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As you know, I was appointed Director of the Governor's War on
Crime .... Because of this unique approach to the crime problem, it
has drawn both national and international attention to the Wackenhut
Corporation and me. I must confess that the tremendous amount of
publicity which we have received came as quite a surprise. . . . [The
Wackenhut name is now known from coast to coast.
I am pleased to announce -that our dollar volume of private inves-
tigative work has increased 63% during the first quarter of 1967 over
the same period a year ago. If we were to include the additional dollar
value resulting from the Governor's War on Crime investigations our
increase jumps to 208%.169
The Program posed yet another problem as a result of the possible use
of state information by a private organization. The Director took steps to
segregate state files from the files of the corporation, as the Governor had
ordered him to do. But information stored in a person's brain is not segre-
gated as easily. An investigator who works mornings for the state might
find it impossible to forget information received in the morning when work-
ing for the corporation in the afternoon. This problem is plaguing the
federal government in its employment of part-time consulting personnel, 170
and is insoluble.
Conflict of interest may manifest itself not only in favoritism but also
in subversion of public policy. Mr. Wackenhut has furnished an example of
just such a possibility. It may well be in the interest of the state not to
publicize the results of the efforts of the War on Crime investigators; it well
may be in the interest of the state to publish such results with emphasis
on future programs, on rehabilitation, on sociological studies, or on recon-
sideration of the existing criminal legislation. These interests may not be
compatible with the interests of the Wackenhut Corporation to demon-
strate and advertise its investigative capabilities in order to attract addi-
tional business. Mr. Wackenhut did not miss such an opportunity. On April
24, 1967, at the stockholders meeting of the Corporation, he said:
In the short span of 14 weeks ... we have been eminently successful.
I am proud to announce the following statistics . ...
855 complaint letters have been received and phone calls have been
averaging 10 per day. Approximately 18% of these communications
contained information of substance. 16 matters have been referred to
Federal agencies . ...
Since January 3, 1967 we have opened 447 cases. We have closed
57 cases. One case remains unassigned and we presently have 389 cases
under active investigation.
17 persons have been arrested and are presently awaiting trial on 44
separate criminal counts .... 171
169 Wackenhut Address, supra note 77, at 3, 4.
170 CIF, supra note 159, at 175.
171 Wackenhut Address, supra note 77, at 3, 4.
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The potential conflict of interest that such a statement represents is dear.
Mr. Wackenhut donated his services to the state. He did not sever his
connections with the Wackenhut Corporation and continued to serve as its
president. It may safely be assumed that he devoted some of his time to
the corporation. Such activity was facilitated by the location of the Pro-
gram's headquarters in the corporation's offices. An employee's involvement
with, and attitude towards, his work and his sense of belonging are all
affected by the compensatory system under which he is employed. An em-
ployee's feeling of obligation to give service is diminished by a charitable
arrangement of a dollar a year payment, and his desire to continue to give
such service over a long period is, by necessity, limited. Such services are
transitory as far as the employee is concerned, and are or become peripheral
to his other activities. Such an arrangement also furnishes a moral justifi-
cation for the receipt of intangible benefits, which may be hard to assess
but which may cause great harm to the state and to the moral stature of
the civil service.
The employment of part-time personnel and independent contractors
has been justified on the grounds that top management and scientific capa-
bilities are difficult to recruit, that in some fields, especially in science, ex-
perts are reluctant or unable to work under close surveillance of a regulated
environment, or that efficiency and economy dictate the use of outside ser-
vices where they are not essentially governmental and are not required on a
regular and continuous basis. Difficulty in recruiting may have justified the
appointment of Mr. Wackenhut. No other justification applied to him,
and none was applicable to his corporation and its investigators. With re-
spect to Mr. Wackenhut, the question remains whether his qualifications
were so unique as to warrant his engagement under 'this "package deal."
It seems that, in the opinion of the Governor, a War on Crime is essen-
tially a matter of investigations, acquisition of information and evidence,
and bringing criminals to 'trial. This attitude is manifest in the Director's
attitude towards the problem and his emphasis on investigations with a view
to obtaining convictions. In his address to the Wackenhut Corporation's
stockholders, he proudly enumerated the convictions produced by his in-
vestigators: breaking and entering, robbery, perjury, bribery, conversion of
official funds, grand larceny, narcotics violations and prostitution. This des-
cription is very disturbing. Mr. Wackenhut treated the state's War on Crime
in exactly the same manner as he 'treated his other customers. His inves-
tigators served complainants just as they served other customers. 172 Their
aim was to obtain convictions, and "organized crime" seems to have meant
any violation of the law. Query whether this attitude can bring about a
victory over crime and violence, and, above all, whether a private detective,
however capable and experienced, is the right choice as a director for such
a War on Crime Program.
172 Id. at 5. In that address he referred to the corporation's "governmental and com-
mercial business."
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Regarding the public, the whole arrangement had an unwholesome ap-
pearance that tended to raise suspicion in the mind of the public as to the
integrity of public servants. Regarding the regulars in law enforcement
forces, the extent of the harmful effect of this arrangement on their morale
can only be guessed. Not only did the Governor assert the inability of reg-
ular law enforcement forces to deal with the problem of crime, but he also
emphasized their need for help from "professional crime fighters," 173 imply-
ing that the regular forces were not. The different compensatory arrange-
ment with experts must have also engendered bitter feelings among the reg-
ulars, who are underpaid and overworked.
The launching of this Program may have had a salutary effect, in that
it could have generated discussion as to the desirability of centralizing police
and eliminating fragmented law enforcement activities, as advocated by
many.174 The problem is real and, indeed, universal.17 5 But a program such
as this does not provide the solution.
178 Governor's Address, supra note 160.
174 Smith, supra note 80, at 301-04.
175 On the murder of an 18-year-old freshman at Eastern Michigan University it was
reported: "The police investigation had proved fruitless until last week. Friction among
some of the five police agencies working on the case impeded progress, causing Governor
William Milliken to observe that the departments had displayed only 'passive coopera-
tion' with one another." Time Magazine, Aug. 8, 1969, at 19.
